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Abstract
We consider two symmetric upstream firms producing independent goods that sell to consumers through a common
retailer. The distinguishing feature of the retailer is that she has a selling capacity, in the sense, that there is an upper
limit in the total units of the two goods she can sell. We obtain that the retailer has incentives to reduce her selling
capacity in order to increase the pay-off she obtains in the vertical structure.
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1 Introduction
Gabrielsen and Sorgard (1999) study the case where two upstream …rms, producing a di¤erent
good each, sells them through a common retailer.1 If the retailer commits to sell only one good,
she will obtain better supply contracts. The fact that by accepting to stock only a good, a
retailer gives up the possibility of stocking another good increases her outside option. With
the accepted good, the retailer has to obtain at least the pro…ts she would obtain with the
rejected good. The authors …nd cases where the gains obtained through better supply contracts
outweighs the losses due to less variety o¤ered to consumers. Therefore, in these cases, the
retailer decides to carry only one good.
In this note, the retailer has no commitment power to limit the number of goods she sells.
However she can put a limit to the number of units of the goods she can sell, by choosing
the dimension of the available shelf space, what we will call as selling capacity. The same
logic as before applies at the margin. An upstream …rm to increase marginally its sales should
compensate the retailer for the marginal reduction in sales of the other good. Then the retailer
will obtain better deals from suppliers. So the choice of selling capacity involves a trade-o¤ for
the retailer. On the one hand, a low capacity implies better supply contracts but on the other
hand implies a lower level of sales. This trade-o¤ is resolved such that the chosen selling capacity
is lower than the level that maximizes total industry pro…ts.
2 Model
Assume we have two producers (1 and 2). Producer 1 (2) produces good 1 (2). Goods 1 and
2 are independent. Demand of good i (i=1,2) is given by  =  ¡ , where  and  are
1 Inderst and Sha¤er (2007) and Dana (2012) also study the advantage of retailers to commit to be supplied
by one upstream …rm.
respectively the price and the quantity sold of good i. Upstream …rms sell the goods through a
common retailer. The distinguishing characteristic of the retailer is that it has a limited shelf
space. In particular, we assume that the total units of the two goods that she can sell is not
greater than . In particular, if  denotes the quantity that the retailer sells of good ( = 1 2),
we must have that 0 · 1 + 2 · . Assume that there are neither production nor retailing
costs.
We consider that selling capacity is    and study the following contracting game. In
the …rst stage, producers (1 and 2) o¤er supply contracts () ( = 1 2). Each contract is
a function that maps the sales of good i  to a monetary payment. In the second stage, the
retailer decides whether to accept the contract or not. In the third stage, the retailer chooses the
level of sales. This contracting game has been previously studied by Bernheim and Whinston
(1998).
Before stating the equilibrium, we introduce the following de…nitions. Given sales (1 2),
total industry pro…ts are given by:
(1 2) = (¡ 1)1 + (¡ 2)2
We have that
(¤ ¤) =argmax12 f(1 2) s.t. 1 + 2 · g = (

2 

2 )
¤ =argmax1 f(1 0) s.t. 1 · g =
8
>><
>>:
 if  · 2

2 otherwise
¤ =argmax2 f(0 2) s.t. 2 · g =
8
>><
>>:
 if  · 2

2 otherwise
Observe that symmetry implies that ¤ = ¤.
Then the maximal pro…ts at the industry level are ¦ = (¤ ¤). The maximal pro…ts if the
retailer can only trade with producer 1 is ¦1 = (¤ 0) and the maximal pro…ts if the retailer
can only trade with producer 2 is ¦2 = (0 ¤). Observe that    implies that
¦  ¦1 +¦2
that is Assumption B2 in Bernheim and Whinston (1998)2. Then, we rewrite Proposition 2 in
Bernheim and Whinston (1998).
Proposition 1 (Proposition 2 Bernheim and Whinston (1998)) There is an equilibrium of the
contracting game in which the retailer accepts both manufacturer’s contracts and chooses (¤ ¤).
The pay-o¤ of the retailer is ¦1 +¦2¡¦. Furthermore, this equilibrium weakly dominates (for
the manufacturers) any other equilibrium of this game.
In our case, the pay-o¤ of the retailer is given by:
¦1 +¦2 ¡¦ =
8
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
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2
2 ¡ (¡

2 ) otherwise.
The important thing is that this pay-o¤ is quasi-concave with a maximum at  = 3 .
Therefore, it holds that by making shelf space scarce, the retailer can increase the rents obtained
from the vertical structure. Next proposition summarizes.
Proposition 2 Assume that the retailer can choose the selling capacity before the contracting
game and its equilibrium is the one in Proposition 1. Then she would restrict capacity to  = 3 .
2Observe that in our case Assumption B1 in Bernheim and Whinston (1998) holds with equality. Footnote 10
in the paper clari…es that in this case all the results still hold.
3 Conclusion
In the present note, we have explicitly modelled the dimension of retailers. This has shed light on
its possible strategic use vis-à-vis manufacturers. We have showed that by restricting capacity
the retailer increases the competition of suppliers for the scarce shelf space and increases her
pay-o¤. From the countervailing power theory (Galbraith (1952), one expects that buyer power
to be good because it reduces the monopolistic power of manufacturers. However, in the present
note we show that buyer power can be obtained in ways that are detrimental to welfare. In
particular, the retailer reduces her selling capacity and therefore she reduces the sales to …nal
consumers.
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